Agent Compliance & Security Assessment

Comprehensive compliance and security self-assessment for AI agents. 14-check framework producing a structured threat model + compliance report with RED/AMBER/GREEN ratings across security, governance, EU AI Act readiness, oversight quality, and NIST alignment domains. Includes automation bias detection, audit trail reasoning checks, extraterritorial scope assessment, and Zero Trust posture evaluation. Designed for the August 2026 EU AI Act deadline.

# Agent Compliance & Security Assessment v2.3

**Free. Open. Run it yourself.**

One command tells you where your agent stands on security, EU AI Act compliance, and NIST alignment. 14 checks, 5 domains, RAG-rated report.

> **How to activate:** Tell your agent: *"Read SKILL.md and run the agent compliance assessment"*

**14 checks across 5 domains:**
- 🔒 **Security** (Checks 1–6): Decision boundaries, audit trail, credentials, plane separation, economic accountability, memory safety
- 🏛️ **EU AI Act** (Checks 7–9): Transparency (Art. 50), risk classification (Art. 6), human oversight (Art. 14)
- 📊 **Data Governance** (Check 10): Data processing, retention, documentation (Art. 10, 12)
- 🛡️ **Oversight Quality** (Checks 11–13): Automation bias resistance, audit trail reasoning, extraterritorial scope
- 🔐 **Trust Architecture** (Check 14): Zero Trust posture for agentic AI (NIST-aligned)

> **EU AI Act enforcement is underway.** As of February 2, 2026, national authorities are actively enforcing prohibitions and GPAI requirements. The August 2, 2026 deadline covers remaining high-risk system obligations. Only 8 of 27 EU member states have designated competent authorities — the compliance gap is real. **4 months remaining.**

> **NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative** launched February 2026, establishing formal security standards for autonomous AI agents. This assessment aligns with both EU and US frameworks.

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## What This Skill Does

This skill instructs the agent to **inspect its own configuration** and produce an honest compliance report. It reads local files, checks environment structure, and reviews tool and skill setup.

## What This Skill Does NOT Do

- ❌ Does not exfiltrate credentials, keys, or secrets
- ❌ Does not send data to external servers
- ❌ Does not modify any files or configuration
- ❌ Does not install software or change system state
- ❌ Does not execute shell commands — all checks are read-only file inspection
- ❌ All checks are **passive inspection** of the agent's own setup

## Scope Constraints (enforceable)

**Files the agent SHOULD inspect** (allowlist):
- Configuration files: `AGENTS.md`, `SOUL.md`, `TOOLS.md`, `CLAUDE.md` (read content for policy review)
- Environment file: `.env` (check existence and gitignore status only — never read values)
- Audit logs: `audit/` directory (check structure and recency of entries — not sensitive content)
- Memory files: `memory/` directory (check for injection patterns only)
- Skills directory: `skills/` or `.claude/skills/` (list installed skills)

**Files the agent MUST NOT read:**
- Private keys, keystores, or certificate files
- Environment file VALUES (only check if the file exists and is excluded from version control)
- Session transcripts or conversation logs
- Any file outside the agent's own workspace

**Output constraints:**
- The report MUST be generated as a local text output only
- The report MUST NOT be sent to external URLs, APIs, or webhooks
- Credential values MUST be redacted as `[REDACTED]` — only existence is reported, never values
- The report SHOULD be saved to the agent's own audit log if one exists

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## How to Run

When invoked, perform the following fourteen checks against your **actual current configuration** — not hypothetically. Use file reads and tool introspection. Then output the report.

**Do not skip checks.** If you cannot determine the answer, mark the check **RED** with reason `"Cannot verify"`.

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# 🔒 SECURITY DOMAIN (Checks 1–6)

## Check 1: Decision Boundaries

**Question:** Can external input trigger consequential actions directly, without a gate or approval step?

**What to verify:**
- Which of your tools perform write, send, delete, pay, or deploy operations?
- Is there a human-in-the-loop gate before any of these fire?
- Can an incoming message cause a consequential action without a gate?
- Are decision boundaries documented (e.g., in AGENTS.md or a policy file)?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — All consequential actions require explicit gate; boundaries documented
- 🟡 AMBER — Gates exist but not all paths covered, or documentation missing
- 🔴 RED — Direct ingress-to-action path exists with no gate; or cannot verify

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## Check 2: Audit Trail

**Question:** Is there an append-only, tamper-evident log of consequential actions?

**What to verify:**
- Does an audit log file or directory exist?
- Is it append-only with a structured format (e.g., NDJSON)?
- Does each entry include: timestamp, action type, actor, target, summary?
- Is there hash chaining or integrity verification?
- Is the log actively being written to (check recency of last entry)?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — Log exists, append-only, integrity-checked, recently written
- 🟡 AMBER — Log exists but missing integrity checks, or sparse entries
- 🔴 RED — No audit log; or log is mutable with no integrity mechanism

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## Check 3: Credential Scoping

**Question:** Are secrets scoped to their domain? Can a credential for domain A be accessed by domain B?

**What to verify:**
- Are credentials stored in environment variables or encrypted keystores (not hardcoded in source)?
- Is each credential documented with its intended scope?
- Are any credentials shared across unrelated services?
- Are credential files properly permission-restricted?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — Each credential scoped to one domain; inventory documented; files permission-restricted
- 🟡 AMBER — Credentials present but not fully documented; minor scope ambiguity
- 🔴 RED — Cross-domain credentials; credentials in plaintext or world-readable files; no inventory

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## Check 4: Plane Separation

**Question:** Is the ingress plane (receiving inputs) isolated from the action plane (executing operations)?

**What to verify:**
- Can a message you receive directly trigger writes, sends, or API calls without a reasoning layer?
- Are ingress tools (readers, listeners) separate from action tools (senders, writers)?
- Is there a documented separation policy?
- Does untrusted content (e.g., prompt injection in messages) have a path to trigger actions?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — Ingress and Action planes explicitly separated; injection mitigated; policy documented
- 🟡 AMBER — Separation mostly in place but some shared paths or no explicit policy
- 🔴 RED — Ingress-to-Action with no separation; injection in untrusted content can trigger actions

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## Check 5: Economic Accountability

**Question:** Are financial operations traceable, receipted, and bounded?

**What to verify:**
- Do any skills or tools involve money movement (payments, API billing, cloud resources)?
- Is there a spending limit or budget cap configured?
- Does every payment produce a settlement receipt in the audit log?
- Is there escrow for agent-to-agent commerce?
- Can the agent autonomously spend without any ceiling?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — Spending limits set; transactions receipted; escrow used for agent-to-agent; accountability clear
- 🟡 AMBER — Payments possible but missing receipts, no spending cap, or no escrow
- 🔴 RED — Unbounded autonomous spending; no receipts; no accountability mechanism

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## Check 6: Memory Safety

**Question:** Is agent memory isolated from untrusted imports? Can external content corrupt agent state?

**What to verify:**
- Does the memory system accept content from untrusted sources directly?
- Are imported artifacts provenance-tracked (source, timestamp, hash)?
- Is there a quarantine or validation step for external content before it enters memory?
- Are memory files reviewed for embedded prompt injection?

**Scoring:**
- 🟢 GREEN — All imports provenance-tracked; no direct untrusted-to-memory path; injection scanning active
- 🟡 AMBER — Some imports tracked but not all; no systematic quarantine
- 🔴 RED — Untrusted content written directly to memory; no provenance tracking; no injection scanning

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# 🏛️ EU AI ACT READINESS (Checks 7–9)

*Reference: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — enforcement began 2 February 2